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1. Introduction
Estonia has had a currency board arrangement (CBA) for more than 10 years.
Due to the successful performance of the Estonian economy under a CBA the
current position of the Bank of Estonia is to maintain its exchange rate regime
until full participation in the EMU, inter alia, during Estonia’s participation in
ERM 2. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for maintaining the
CBA in the past and whether it is a viable option in the future.
The main aim of this paper is therefore to give an overview of the history of the
Estonian CBA and examine the different aspects of its sustainability. In section
2 the article describes the basic features of the CBA in general and the Estonian
CBA in particular and discusses the rationale for the choice of a CBA in
Estonia. The third section of the article describes the main developments of the
Estonian economy during the last 10 years. Both financial sector and real sector
developments are briefly discussed.
In the fourth section, we assess the sustainability of the Estonian CBA. We
specifically analyse whether the preconditions for the successful performance of
the CBA are in place. First, we examine the fiscal policy stance after the intro-
duction of the currency board with special emphasis upon the period strongly
influenced by external shocks (1997–1999). Secondly, we discuss the flexibility
of the real sector of the economy. For this purpose the flexibility of wage set-
ting, movements in the real exchange rate and changes in foreign trade are
discussed. Thirdly, we analyse the resilience of the banking sector by looking at328 Urmas Sepp, Raoul Lättemäe, Martti Randveer
its performance during the external shocks experienced during the Asian and
Russian crises.
The article concludes that the Estonian economy fulfils the main economic pre-
conditions for the sustainability of the CBA – sufficient fiscal discipline, flexibility
of the real sector and resilience of the financial sector. Therefore, the CBA could
be considered a suitable exchange rate arrangement before Estonia’s entry to
the third stage of the EMU.
2. The History and Overview of the Estonian CBA
For a decade, Estonian monetary policy has been based on the currency board
arrangement (CBA). This part of the paper sketches the evolution of the
Estonian monetary framework since the introduction of the CBA to the present.
2.1. The Basic Features of an Orthodox CBA
A currency board is a special type of fixed exchange rate arrangement, gov-
erned by strict institutional rules. Those rules include a strong explicit (usually
legislative) commitment to a fixed exchange rate and the requirement that do-
mestic currency is issued only against foreign exchange (IMF, 1996). An orthodox
currency board has to stand ready to exchange domestic currency for the re-
serve currency at a specified and fixed exchange rate and all issued currency has
to be backed with foreign reserves or gold.1
Those strict institutional rules eliminate (constrain) the scope for issuing un-
backed monetary liabilities, ensuring that the board does not run out of foreign
reserves to maintain the parity (IMF, 1996). For that reason the issuance of
domestic currency is tied to the growth of foreign reserves in the currency board
(usually directly through the cumulative exchange of reserve currency vis-à-vis
domestic currency at the currency board), and money supply becomes endog-
enous, imitating the changes to central bank foreign reserves. This element of
the currency board is sometimes called the automatic money supply mech-
anism.
1 Full backing of issued currency with foreign reserves and gold is characteristic of an ortho-
dox currency board. Some non-orthodox CBAs have used the requirement that only part of
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The fixed exchange rate under perfect capital mobility sets clear constraints on
pursuing independent monetary policy. Currency boards therefore have limited
power and no incentive to engage discretionary monetary policy or to inter-
vene. This typical characteristic of currency board is called inability (or lack) of
monetary policy. Consequently, the liquidity management of this system is the
responsibility of the markets. The automatic money supply mechanism assures
that excess (or shortage of) liquidity is automatically sterilised (corrected) by
capital movements making money supply endogenous vis-à-vis money demand.
In other words, banks tend to increase their foreign assets if there is no accept-
able demand for their domestic assets (Hanke et al, 1994). The opposite process
is also possible, meaning that banks increase their domestic assets by decreasing
their foreign assets.2 This adjustment mechanism works through interest rate
(and currency)3 arbitrage due to the fixed exchange rate. Evidently, unlimited
convertibility and liberal treatment of capital movements are preconditions for
ensuring the smooth functioning of this feature.
Similarly, the currency boards lack a Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) facility, as
the backing rule constrains unbacked issuance of domestic monetary liabilities
by the board. While an orthodox use of a CBA by definition rules out the LOLR
facility and other monetary policy instruments, in systems similar to a currency
board, such functions are limited to the board’s (central bank’s) excess of
foreign reserves.
A CBA is thus an extreme form of fixed exchange rate systems whereby irre-
versibility of commitment is guaranteed by a legally fixed parity between the
national currency and the reserve currency (Avramov, 1999). As a currency board
2 It is important to note that this does not mean that money supply shadows current account
developments only, as it is sometimes misguidedly assumed and which, therefore, has led to
some criticism of the CBA (see Schuler, 1992). Due to capital flows and bank credit, money
supply is able to grow even in the absence of a current account surplus.
3 Tsang (1998) argues that not only do interest rate hikes contribute towards the stabilisation
of a currency, but there is also a second mechanism in the CBA: currency (exchange rate)
arbitrage. Given the currency boards unlimited convertibility, people (banks) can convert
their cash (domestic currency) into foreign currency via the currency board at the predeter-
mined exchange rate. Then they can sell it on the foreign exchange market, if the market
exchange rate weakens from the official rate, thus bringing the market exchange rate back to
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is a rule-based technical arrangement (a fixed exchange rate with strict commit-
ments and an automatic money supply mechanism), it is not affected by political
pressures. The government cannot print money or borrow from the central bank
to fund its budget deficit; thus inflationary financing of government cannot take
place. These constraints should help to achieve better fiscal discipline (Mihalke,
1997) and the resulting conservative fiscal policy is more important for ensur-
ing the credibility of the CBA. The full backing of issued currency should
guarantee the board’s ability to maintain convertibility with the reserve cur-
rency at their stated fixed rates of exchange.
Those properties of a currency board – limited discretion, rule-based set-up,
legal barriers, and the inability to monetise fiscal deficits – should provide more
credibility for the arrangement when compared with other monetary regimes4.
By providing clear signals about the policy intentions of the authorities, and
ensuring monetary independence from the government, CBAs facilitate an ad-
justment of expectations and promote wage and price discipline, thereby lessening
potential inflation bias (IMF, 1996).
The CBA also bears a certain resemblance (though in a completely modified
context) to gold standard principles – a CBA could be considered a ‘surrogate’
for the automatism and rules of the gold standard. In some sense, it is a return to
the gold standard’s hierarchy of goals and the corresponding adjustment mech-
anisms (Avramov, 1999).
2.2. The Particular Features of the Estonian Currency Board
In Estonia, currency board principles were introduced together with the mon-
etary reform in 1992. The Law on the Security of the Estonian Kroon sets the
legal enforcement of CBA principles. This legislation enforces all the essential
principles of a currency board:
4 Rivera Batiz and Sy (1997) analysed credibility effects of the CBA. They found that the
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i) Kroon exchange rate determined with respect to the German mark;5
ii) Bank of Estonia is prohibited to devalue the kroon;
iii) kroons issued (ie currency in circulation and deposits held in the Bank
of Estonia) require full backing with convertible foreign currencies
and gold;
iv) full convertibility of issued kroons guaranteed at the official rate;
v) Bank of Estonia issues kroons only against corresponding change in
foreign reserves.
As we can see, the Law on the Security of the Estonian Kroon in fact enforces
the currency board framework in quite an orthodox form in Estonia. However,
the currency board is not institutionally separated from the central bank. Ac-
cording to the law, the Bank of Estonia is responsible for the following duties
typical of a central bank – maintaining the stability of the legal tender, conduc-
ting banking and monetary policy (as far as it does not contradict the principles
mentioned above), promoting financial stability, implementing banking supervi-
sion (until 2002), collecting statistics, conducting research, etc. In implementing
its tasks, the Bank of Estonia is independent from all government agencies.
Loans to the government by the Bank of Estonia are prohibited and the bank is
not liable for the state’s financial obligations.
The institutional unification of currency board principles with the other duties
of the central bank, however, does not mean a weakening in the enforcement of
CBA principles, since the most fundamental are guaranteed by Law. The scope
for possible monetary policy is therefore legislatively limited by the amount of
excess reserves in the central bank (ie CBA constraints).
This can also be seen from the practical implementation of monetary policy in
Estonia (see also Appendix). Concerning the monetary policy operational frame-
work, CBA principles are managed via the facility provided by the Bank of
Estonia in the forex market. This results in an unlimited forex purchase and sale
facility (‘forex window’) for all major currencies (including the euro and USD)
5 The exact exchange rate of kroon (1 DEM = 8 EEK) was set by a separate decree of the
Bank of Estonia. However, only parliament has the power to make changes to the central
parity. Since 1999, the kroon is through German mark fixed also with a euro (1 EUR =
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against the Estonian kroon. Transactions at the forex window are initiated by
commercial banks (ie there are no discretionary interventions by the central
bank) and there are no restrictions or limits of access to this facility for commer-
cial banks. Moreover, there are no exchange rate spreads for euro (purchase
and sale) transactions in this facility, meaning that all forex transactions (pur-
chase and sale) with EUR (before 1999 DEM) are carried out at the central
parity of the currency board.
Transactions at the forex window constitute the only channel for base-money
issuance6, assuring that money supply is only adjusted according to changes in
the central bank’s foreign reserves. In other words, there is no active monetary
policy in Estonia. There is no central bank policy rate or other operational mon-
etary policy targets in Estonia. Therefore, there exists neither discretionary
monetary policy instruments7 nor an explicit LOLR facility.8 The currency sta-
bility objective is tied to the anchoring role of the exchange rate, and all the
necessary adjustments are left to the market. Consequently, the key role in achiev-
ing and maintaining sufficient liquidity buffers remains with the financial system.
The CBA is supported by the reserve requirements placed upon banks. These
have been somewhat higher in Estonia, compared to other Central European
transition countries, in order to promote stronger financial discipline and
strengthen the financial sector as well as to compensate for the lack of a LOLR
facility.
These differences do not constitute a major divergence from CBA principles but
rather a minor complement to the CBA. The institutional unification does not
6 A slight divergence from this principle existed between 1993–2000, when the Bank of
Estonia issued central bank CDs. In addition, on rare occasions, the Bank of Estonia has
extended liquidity support to the banking sector that has also influenced base money supply.
7 Between 1993–2000, the Bank of Estonia’s monetary instruments also contained the issu-
ance of certificates of deposits. The initial aim of the CDs was to increase the efficiency of
the inter-bank money market and to smooth seasonal fluctuations in the cash demand cycles.
However, due to the introduction of the averaging principle to the reserve requirement in
1996 and the small overall amount of CDs, the instrument lost its initial importance. The
volumes of CDs were kept small and yield capped.
8 As there have existed excess reserves during most of the CBA period, those loans are not
explicitly ruled out either. In practice, such support from the Bank of Estonia has however
been limited to specific cases that were made to avoid excessive systemic risk in the financial
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result in a weakening of CBA principles, since they are guaranteed by law. There
is a strong rationale for backing clearing accounts in a modern currency board
(see Yam, 1999). Therefore, this should actually increase the credibility of the
arrangement9. The reserve requirements do not contradict CBA principles, but
may be regarded as a ‘substitute’ for the LOLR facility. Finally, the possibility
for some monetary policy, stemming from excess foreign reserves, has largely
remained a ‘theoretical possibility’. The only discretionary instrument the Bank
of Estonia has used was the issuance of CDs between 1993–2000, where the
amounts were small and the aim was directed toward enforcing the develop-
ment of the inter-bank money market. In summary, we can claim that the CBA
has been implemented in rather an orthodox form in Estonia.
Hence, the actual set-up of Estonian monetary policy also follows quite ortho-
dox CBA principles. The most important differences are: (1) the currency board
has not been institutionally separated from the central bank; (2) the backing
requirement in Estonia does not cover only notes and coins, but also accounts at
the Bank of Estonia; (3) reserve requirements exist as an instrument supporting
financial discipline; and (4) a theoretical possibility to conduct some monetary
policy using excess foreign reserves also exists.
2.3. The Rationale for the Choice of a CBA in Estonia
The rationale for the initial choice in favour of a CBA in Estonia was complex
and combined political and economic as well as pragmatic aspects. Regimes
ranging from free floating to complete ‘dollarisation’ were considered during
the pre-reform period10.
One set of reasons for the choice of a CBA was connected to institutional un-
derdevelopment, namely to limited central banking expertise as well as a lack of
knowledge concerning transmission mechanisms. This knowledge was difficult
to acquire in the early 1990s, as statistical data about the economy was poor or
lacking. In addition, prior to reform the Bank of Estonia did not have any
9 In Estonia, the interbank clearing system is in the central bank. Most of the accounts in the
central bank are settlement accounts.
10 For an overview of the discussion on the rationale of the choice of the CBA and implemen-
tation of the monetary reform in Estonia see Knöbl, Sutt and Zavoico (2002).334 Urmas Sepp, Raoul Lättemäe, Martti Randveer
experience in implementing independent monetary policy. In an environment of
rapid structural transformations, there was clearly insufficient knowledge
concerning transmission channels and relevant time lags in order to conduct
discretionary monetary policy. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate under a CBA
was chosen partially for its simplicity.
The second set of reasons for the choice of a CBA stemmed from an economic
situation that called for very rapid stabilisation. The limited convertibility and
hyperinflation of the Russian rouble as well as problems with cash circulation
had made monetary stability and credibility the first and most important precon-
dition for other economic reforms in 1992. A CBA was believed to be one way
to rapidly reduce inflation, increase credibility and also increase fiscal commit-
ment. Therefore, a CBA was chosen so as to gain credibility and provide a solid
nominal anchor for stabilisation and restructuring (Sepp and Randveer, 2002).
In addition, the public strongly appealed for a currency with stable external
value together with internal convertibility (as opposed to the non-convertible
rouble at this time) (Lõhmus, 2001). This was believed to be more difficult to
achieve through a more independent monetary regime, considering the
underlying economic situation and the smallness of the economy. It should also
be added that the general academic and political discussion concerning
monetary regimes in the early 1990s (in preparation for creating monetary
union in Europe) was also probably more in favour of monetary unions and rigid
exchange regimes.
In choosing an anchor currency, the Swedish kronor, Finnish markka and ECU
were considered in addition to the German mark as candidates for the peg or
even as candidates for full ‘dollarisation’. There were very strong arguments in
favour of pegging the kroon to the ECU and for some time it even formed the
basis for the monetary reform plans (Kelder, 1997). A single currency peg was
however believed to be more transparent and simpler than pegging to the cur-
rency basket. Besides, any other basket of currencies would have been difficult
to compile. Russia and the former Soviet Union were Estonia’s main trade part-
ners during that period, but substantial reorientation of trade in the coming years
was expected.
The final choice of the German mark was based on the importance of the DEM
(as a proxy for the ECU) and on the belief that it would help to reorient external
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only existed as a unit of account; hence, it would have been more difficult to
explain such a choice to the public (Kelder, 1997). However, the euro-based
peg already had its roots ten years ago. In the light of this it is interesting to note
that the US dollar was never brought up as a serious alternative during those
discussions (Lõhmus, 2001).
What is the present validity of those arguments? In the early 1990s the central
monetary policy issue concerned exchange rate based stabilisation – today con-
vergence with the EU is the main issue (The Activity… 2000). In the wake of
EU accession, a fixed exchange rate against the euro still seems feasible. More-
over, the Bank of Estonia has become increasingly convinced that under the
high degree of openness, free capital movement and small domestic money
market, independent monetary policy would be a rather complex issue. In this
regard, by giving up monetary autonomy under a CBA, Estonia has received
monetary stability in return (Sepp and Randveer, 2002).
3. An Overview of the Main Developments of the Estonian Economy under
a CBA
The currency board framework helped to achieve a stable monetary environ-
ment relatively quickly. Here we will give a brief overview of these developments,
concentrating firstly on the monetary and financial developments, and then on
real sector issues. Some of these topics will also receive closer attention in the
fourth part of this paper, where some sustainability issues will be discussed.
3.1. Initial Stabilisation and Nominal Convergence
The ultimate aim of the CBA is to import the price stability of the base currency
into the Estonian economy. The monetary reform in 1992 was carried out in a
hyperinflationary environment, having inflation levels well above 1,000 per cent.
After the monetary reform hyperinflationary pressures continued for some
months, before the first implications of the reform were seen in a rapidly declin-
ing inflation level. In 1993, the inflation quickly declined to 89% from the levels
above 1,000 per cent in 1992 (see Figure 1). As money supply is endogenous
and the discretion of the monetary authority and its (presumable) inflationary
effect is not relevant under the CBA (Sepp et al, 2000), such rapid stabilisation
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not, however, reaching single-digit levels before 1998. In recent years, inflation
has been around 4–5 per cent (See Table 1).
Figure 1.
Annual inflation in Estonia during 1992–2002 (logarithmic scale)
It is important to note that due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, price increases
will remain somewhat higher in Estonia compared to those in advanced econ-
omies. The main driving force for this is the higher productivity growth in Estonia
due to the real convergence, which yields convergence of the structure and level
of prices as well. This effect is believed to cause an inflation difference of about
1.5–2.5 percentage points compared to inflation in advanced economies
(Randveer, 2000). Considering the smallness and openness of Estonia, import
prices will also remain important in determining inflation in Estonia.
Similarly, Estonian interest rates also started to decline after the introduction of
the CBA. As under the CBA, domestic interest rates should converge with an-
chor currency interest rates (plus risk premium) due to arbitrage possibilities.
This decline in interest rates was also expected. In general, during the times of
high capital mobility (the capital account was fully liberalised in 1994 in
Estonia) and lower risks, the margin between Estonian and German interest
rates has indeed shown a declining pattern. Money market rates have followed
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only exceptions have been the turbulent years of 1997 and 1998, when Estonian
interest rates were pulled away from this convergence path. The real sector
retail rates have also decreased substantially (due to decrease in interest rate
margins) – from about 40–60% in the early 1990s to 8–9% at present.
Figure 2.
Short-term money market rates vs 3month DEM/Euribor rates in Estonia
3.2. Financial Deepening
The financial sector has experienced major developments both in terms of qual-
ity and in terms of volume during the last decade. The financial reforms started
with the demolition of the mono-bank system and establishment of a two-tier
banking system (Monetary… 1999). The introduction of the CBA created a
stable monetary environment for financial development. The depth of financial
intermediation in Estonia has increased substantially since the financial reforms
started. At the beginning of 1993, banking sector assets compromised about
20% of GDP, whereas at the end of 2001 this figure was more than 70%. These
rapid developments were accompanied both by strong consolidation and bank-
ruptcies – the number of banks has dropped from 42 in 1992 to 7 in 2002.
Despite the poor starting point, the banking sector has gone through major re-
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activities. The environment created by the fixed exchange rate liberalised capi-
tal movements and limited Lender-of-Last-Resort capabilities under the CBA
made the strengthening of the financial sector a crucial issue almost immedi-
ately after the monetary reform. Strict policies – for example already opening
the capital account in 1994 and privatising the banking sector by 1996 – has
yielded a sound and effective privately-owned (foreign-owned)11 financial sec-
tor in Estonia. The financial deepening ratios – for example, the domestic credit
or banking sector assets as a percentage of GDP – are among the highest in
accession countries. At the same time the share of non-performing loans has
been kept under control, being less than 2% in 2001. The integration of differ-
ent financial market segments has given banking groups the leading position in
financial intermediation (Monetary… 1999).
The financial markets in Estonia have generally adopted the ‘universal banking’
model. The securities market in Estonia is primarily an equities market. How-
ever, the securities and equity market play a secondary role for real sector
financing. Unlike in many other countries, the government securities market has
not been the driving force for the development of the securities market. In addi-
tion to domestic sources, real sector direct foreign borrowing from international
sources (usually through the foreign mother-company) has increased substan-
tially, making up about half of real sector borrowed funds. This is an important
aspect, as during some periods (especially after the Russian crisis in 1998 and
1999) real sector direct foreign borrowing partly substituted the diminishing
credit supply through the domestic financial sector.
3.3. Financing Real Sector Credit Demand
The real sector monetary and credit growth has followed a similar pattern to
that of the growth in banking sector assets. The major ‘jump’ in real sector
borrowing and monetary growth took place in 1996–97, when the creditworthi-
ness of Estonian banks and companies increased and the financial sector gained
rapidly increasing access to foreign capital markets. This clearly reduced con-
straints on financial sector resources, yielding rapid growth of domestic credit
as well as asset prices. As the scale of available financial resources increased, it
enabled the fostering of credit supply rather quickly using foreign capital. The
high credit demand stemmed from the fact that real sector access to bank credit
11 Swedish and Finnish financial conglomerates hold about 82% of banks share capital.339 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
had been rather limited in prior years as well as because skyrocketing asset
prices were fostering overoptimistic expectations. As the authorities’ ability to
react to such an expansion with monetary policy measures is clearly constrained
under the CBA, the set of measures taken also contained prudential (see also
Appendix) and fiscal measures.
The consolidation of the banking sector and changes to the ownership structure
in 1998 and 1999 resulted in a significant strengthening of the banks’ capital
base and liquidity as well as improved corporate governance and internal risk
control activities. The domestic monetary developments have been more bal-
anced in recent years. Dramatic changes to monetary developments, as happened
in the mid-1990s, are hence less likely to happen in today’s environment.
Table 1.
Selected indicators 1992–2001
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001p
Real GDP growth (%) -14.2 -9.0 -2.0 4.3 3.9 9.8 4.6 -0.6 7.1 5.0
GDP PPP compared to
EU average 30 32 34 37 38 37 38 40
CPI 1076 89.8 47.7 29.0 23.1 11.2 8.2 3.3 4.0 5.8
Current account balance
(% of GDP) 1.3 -7.2 -4.4 -9.2 -12.1 -9.2 -4.7 -6.0 -6.2
Exports of goods and
services (% of GDP) 55.4 69.6 75.3 72.0 67.1 78.4 79.7 77.2 93.8 90.6
Banking sector assets
(% of GDP) 19 29.3 34.8 38.0 43.8 63.4 55.7 61.7 67.7 72.0
Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) -0.7 +1.3 -1.3 -1.9 +2.2 -0.3 -4.7 -0.4 +0.4
Interest rates of real
sector loans12 32.6 23.2 17.2 13.1 11.9 13.1 10.8 9.5 8.7
Unemployment  (%) 6.5 7.6 9.7 10.0 9.7 9.9 12.3 13.7 12.6
Central Government debt
(% of GDP) 2.2 5.6 5.0 5.2 6.2 5.2 4.3 4.6 3.2 2.7
3.4. Encouraging Fiscal Discipline
The introduction of the CBA was a crucial part of the stabilisation package. An
important reason for choosing the CBA was the need to gain credibility. The
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currency board framework created a stable monetary environment for the
real sector and provided a solid nominal anchor for both stabilisation and
further restructuring in Estonia (Sepp and Randveer, 2002). Nevertheless,
the CBA and macroeconomic performance in general could not have been
successful without the support and consistency from other macroeconomic
policies. Fiscal discipline, a liberalised external account, large-scale priva-
tisation and encouragement of private sector development through structural
reforms have all been important components of the policy mix, contributing
to the stability and growth.
The political consensus for fiscal discipline throughout the entire decade should
be strongly underlined13. The monetary reform was carried out with substantial
fiscal tightening and relatively strong budget discipline. In order to sustain budget
discipline, the tax reform was carried out in line with monetary reform. Value
added tax was increased from 10% to 18%; corporate tax on dividends was
increased to 35% and the upper limit for personal income taxes was increased to
50%. In 1994, the progressive income tax system was replaced with a propor-
tional income-tax system with a uniform income tax rate of 26%. The idea of
keeping the fiscal budget balanced has been a relevant basis of macroeconomic
policy since monetary reform.
3.5. Market Driven Trade Policy
Another important tool for reinforcing market discipline and resource alloca-
tion along with the economy’s comparative advantage has been the free trade
model. The choice of a free trade model was influenced by the introduction of
the CBA as under this exchange rate arrangement the liberalisation of current
account transactions are of great importance in guaranteeing smooth adjust-
ment processes in the economy. There have been almost no restrictions on imports
during the entire 1990s, which is rather unique when compared to other Euro-
pean countries. Minor customs on some groups of goods from non-EU countries
were introduced in 1999 as an institutional step toward the EU. The relevance
of those tariffs is insignificant, however, as the majority of trade is carried out
with EU countries (see below). The liberal trade model, free capital movement
13 To some extent the maintenance of the fiscal discipline was eased by the fact that after
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and stable currency have yielded a very high level of economic openness –
foreign trade comprises about 200 per cent of GDP today, whereas in 1992 it
was about 100 per cent. Export forms the basis for Estonia’s economic growth.
Since monetary reform, export volumes have increased by more than five times
(in dollar terms).
Reorientation of trade has also been impressive – in 1990, exports to advanced
western countries accounted for less than 2% (Lõhmus, 2001) compared to 70–
80% today. The stable and convertible Estonian kroon probably intensified the
change in trade structure towards western countries – already at the end of
1992, the most important trade partner became Finland, pushing Russia into the
second place. Initially such reorientation involved only imports, but within a
few years exporting activities also began to change.  Today about 60–70 per
cent of trade is conducted in euro-area currencies (and with EU countries), and
so in currencies with which Estonia has anchored its exchange rate. This
reorientation was crucial to subordinate considerable demand risks stemming
from unstable CIS markets, and to facilitate Estonia’s integration towards Eu-
ropean economies through vital improvements in productivity.
A wide trade deficit is a usual feature of rapid economic growth and restructur-
ing in transition economies, reflecting high investment needs. In Estonia the
average current account deficit (CAD) since 1994 has been around 7% of GDP.
The sustainability of such a high deficit, however, has been broadly secured by
FDI inflows, these being sufficient to cover the current account deficit, except
for during the boom years of 1996–97. The average FDI since 1994 has been
around 6% of GDP. The impact of FDI on the balance of payments is however
dual – FDI does not only help to finance the current account deficit but also to
increase the CAD through increased imports of investment goods. Neverthe-
less, the sustainability of the CAD is an important issue under the CBA, as the
disposable monetary tools used by the authorities in case of consumption-driven
expansion are clearly constrained.
3.6. Real Convergence
In summing up, economic growth has been relatively good in Estonia since 1995
(the average GDP growth between 1995–2001 has been 5 per cent) – exceeding
growth rates in the EU by about 2.5 percentage points and outperforming many
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ing monetary policy with the CBA has had a serious negative impact on econ-
omic growth in Estonia14.
Consequently, income levels in Estonia relative to the EU have increased from
30% in 1994 to 40% in 2001. This growth has been based on rapid reintegration
into the European economy, and the attendant growth in exports to that region.
The economic recession in the beginning of the 1990s (peaking at about -15%
in 1992) can be attributed to initial stabilisation, as similar phenomena have also
been recognised at the beginning of the transition in other transition economies.
4. The Sustainability of the Estonian CBA
In the following section, we analyse the sustainability of the Estonian CBA by
examining whether the economic preconditions for the successful performance
of the currency board are in place. The main preconditions considered impor-
tant for the sustainability of the CBA are fiscal discipline, flexibility of the product
and labour markets and the resilience of the financial sector.
4.1. Fiscal Policy Stance
Fiscal discipline is an essential prerequisite for the sustainability of the CBA.
The CBA eliminates or strictly limits the monetary authorities’ ability to monetise
fiscal deficits. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that the government
could run irresponsible fiscal policy via excessive borrowing from capital mar-
kets. This, in turn, might undermine the stability of the economy and create
political pressures for abandoning the CBA, thereby increasing the risk of a
currency crisis. Therefore, fiscal policy should be aimed at achieving sustain-
able economic growth. This is underlined by the fact that under a CBA, the
14 In addition to Estonian experience, several studies have indicated that the lack of inde-
pendent monetary policy under a CBA is not harmful for economic growth. For example
Gulde et al, (2000) found that CBAs had lower inflation, faster GDP growth and lower
government deficits than other exchange regimes (they used de facto rather than de jure
classification). Similarly, Ghosh et al, (1998) report, that CBAs have lower inflation and as
good growth performance as other fixed exchange rate regimes. Conversely, Kwan and Lui
(1996) simulated different monetary regimes in Hong Kong, finding that a CBA indeed re-
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central bank cannot implement effective discretionary monetary policy – the
primary policy tool for macroeconomic stabilisation is fiscal policy.
As mentioned earlier there has been a relatively strong political consensus for
fiscal discipline in Estonia. As a result, Estonia’s public debt – both domestic
and external – is still at a very low level (less than 10 per cent of GDP) making
Estonia more resistant to volatile capital flows. Most of the government bor-
rowing has been used to finance specific investment projects (eg investments
into roads). Quite high fiscal discipline is also reflected by the fact that currently
the market for government securities is non-existent. The public debt consists
of guarantees for loans to the private sector (originating from the beginning of
the 1990s) and loans attained from international financial organisations like EBRD
and the World Bank. Maintaining a low level of public debt has also been easier
because of a low starting point – Estonia did not inherit any obligations regard-
ing the debt in the Soviet Union.
At times, the fiscal policy has also been used for stabilisation purposes. The role
of fiscal policy became crucial between 1997 and mid-1998. By spring 1997, the
extensive capital inflow and credit developments (with annual growth above
70%) yielded a rapid widening of the current account deficit – the current ac-
count deficit exceeding 14% of GDP. The stabilisation package, aimed at curbing
an overheating economy, also contained, among other actions, the decision to
raise public savings and to establish a Stabilisation Reserve Fund with these
savings (see the Appendix). Investing the funds of the Stabilisation Reserve Fund
abroad served the aim of reducing domestic liquidity and sustaining foreign in-
vestor confidence in economic policy. That resulted in a substantial change in
the fiscal stance. Starting from a fiscal deficit in 1996 (ca 2% of GDP) the
government balanced the budget in the first half of 1997 and generated a budget
surplus in the second half of the year. Because of the tightening of fiscal policy,
the annual surplus reached 2% of GDP in 1997. This tight fiscal policy also
continued into the first half of 1998. Although the possible calming impact of
these steps on aggregate demand versus the impact from declining capital flows
due to the Asian crisis may be questioned, the policies were directly aimed at
reducing the overheating and to avoid a balance of payment crisis.
The largest public sector deficit was witnessed in 1999. The rapid loosening of
the fiscal stance was the result of several factors. The deterioration of the fiscal
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that started with the Russian crisis in the second half of 1998. While in the first
half of 1998 economic growth was nearly 10%, in the first half of 1999, the
economy contracted by over 2%. The impact of the economic slowdown on the
fiscal position was exacerbated by the fact that the 1999 draft budget was elabo-
rated upon before the full extent of the slowdown and was based on overly
optimistic growth expectations. In addition, the draft was worked out and passed
at the Parliament in a pre-election period. As a result, the deficit amounted to
over 6% of GDP in the first half of 1999. The deficit was financed from the
reserve built up during the years of fiscal surpluses. In addition, the government
used the proceeds from the privatisation of Eesti Telekom (which took place in
the first quarter of 1999) to finance the budget deficit.
After the elections, the new government prepared a supplementary budget, which
was adopted by the Parliament in June 1999, cutting expenditures by about
1.2% of GDP. As a result, the public sector deficit decreased somewhat in the
second half of 1999, and for the year as a whole the deficit was equal to 4.7 %
of GDP. Because of a pick-up in economic activity starting at the beginning of
2000 and a strict fiscal policy, the authorities succeeded in lowering the deficit
to 0.7 % of GDP in 2000 and posting a public sector surplus in 2001 (0.4 % of
GDP) (see Figure 3).
Figure 3.
The dynamics of economic growth and fiscal deficit in 1996–2000
It could be concluded that, up to now, the authorities have implemented a
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manageable and have swiftly reacted to avoid large fiscal deficits – thereby sup-
porting the sustainability of the CBA. In addition, the fiscal policy has been
used for stabilisation purposes between 1997 – mid-1998 to reduce an over-
heating of domestic demand.
4.2. The Flexibility of the Real Sector of the Estonian Economy
Given the fixed exchange rate regime, real sector flexibility (especially labour
market flexibility) is an important prerequisite for the sustainability of the CBA.
As the authorities cannot implement a discretionary exchange rate policy, the
adjustment processes in the Estonian economy can happen only via changes in
prices and wages. The importance of the flexibility of the real sector is also
stressed by the fact that as a small open economy, Estonia is exposed to external
shocks.
After the monetary reform, the authorities have set relatively few restrictions
and regulations upon the functioning of the labour market (a review of the insti-
tutional aspects of Estonian labour markets and comparisons with OECD
countries and EU accession countries is provided by Rõõm (2002)). When com-
pared to labour markets in the EU, the unemployment benefit and minimum
wage in Estonia have been considerably lower. In addition, the role of labour
unions in the private sector has been quite insignificant.
During the last five years, the unemployment benefit has been less than 10% of
the average gross salary. The period a person is eligible for the unemployment
benefit is currently 270 days. However, starting from 2003, workers who have
become unemployed are entitled to unemployment insurance, which is equal to
50% of the previous pay for the first 100 days and 40% of the previous pay for
the next 80 days.
During the last 10 years, the minimum wage has accounted for 22–36% of the
average gross salary. Currently the minimum wage is slightly over 30% of the
average wage. When compared to OECD countries and other transition econo-
mies the minimum wage in Estonia is below the average level.
The share of workers who are members of labour unions has decreased signifi-
cantly during the last decade. Currently, private and public sector employees
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workforce, respectively (Rõõm, 2002). Similarly to the minimum wage and un-
employment benefit levels, union membership in Estonia is among the lowest
when compared to EU members and other accession countries.
The main factors that may have decreased the flexibility of the labour market
have been relatively high severance payments and long employer notice periods.
The severance payments in the private and public sector are equal to between
2–4 months and 2–12 months of the previous monthly pay (depending on the
length of employment with the employer), respectively. The employer notice
period is usually between 2–4 months depending on the length of employment.
Most of the studies that have directly or indirectly analysed the flexibility of the
real sector have concluded that Estonian goods and labour markets are fairly
flexible.
Vesilind and Rell (2000) used the period 1996–1999 to estimate the flexibility
of wage setting in the economy. They found that wages were quite flexible in the
tradable sector of the economy – changes in productivity had a strong impact on
wages (see Figure 4). In the sheltered sector of the economy, the relationship
between productivity and wages was less evident. In the public sector, however,
changes in economic activity had a negligible effect on the wages of the public
sector employees.
Figure 4.
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Faggio and Konings (1999), Haltivanger et al, (1999) and Eamets (2001)15 have
concluded that when compared to Central European transition economies la-
bour mobility in Estonia is higher. This tendency was especially evident in the
first half of the 1990s, which was characterised by large-scale restructuring of
the economy. Therefore, the relatively low unemployment rate in Estonia dur-
ing the first half of the 90s has been attributed to high labour mobility. However,
preliminary findings by Rõõm (2002) suggest that the increase in the unemploy-
ment rate in Estonia in the late 1990s was associated with a decrease in labour
mobility.
The developments during the last years, however, indicate that the flexibility of
the Estonian labour markets should not be overestimated either – during the last
4 years the unemployment ratio in Estonia has been constantly over 10% (in the
first quarter of 2002 it was 11%). The main reason for that is structural unem-
ployment, especially in rural regions.
In addition to directly analysing the flexibility of the labour and goods markets,
the flexibility of the Estonian economy can be assessed indirectly by looking at
the deviations of the actual real effective exchange rate (REER) from the equi-
librium level. In this way one can gain insight into the flexibility of the economy
by looking at whether the actual REER has deviated from the equilibrium level
and how quickly the actual REER has returned to its equilibrium path. It could
be said that the smaller the deviations and the quicker the return of the actual
REER to its equilibrium level the higher the flexibility of the economy.
After the monetary reform in 1992, Estonia has witnessed a strong real ex-
change rate appreciation. As the Estonian kroon was undervalued in the first
years after the monetary reform, part of the appreciation was therefore just the
normal path towards equilibrium, driven by the existing price differential with
western trade partners. Calculations done in the Bank of Estonia (Filipozzi
(2000), Randveer and Rell (2002)) suggest that in addition to the appreciation
of the real effective exchange rate its equilibrium level also appreciated. But the
appreciation of the equilibrium REER has been slower than that of the actual
REER (see Figure 5). According to Randveer and Rell (2002), the actual REER
15 Faggio and Konings (1999) used enterprise level data on labour mobility and Haltivanger
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of the Estonian kroon was undervalued by approximately 20% in 1994 and fluc-
tuated around its equilibrium value between 1996–1997. Because of the Russian
crisis, the actual REER appreciated rapidly and became overvalued by around
5%. According to these calculations, due to the marked deceleration of inflation
in Estonia and weakening of the euro, the REER had attained its equilibrium
value by the beginning of 2000. During 2000–2001, the REER did not signifi-
cantly deviate from its equilibrium value (Randveer and Rell, 2002).
In addition, the dynamics of economic growth in Estonia can be considered
indirect proof that the appreciation of the REER has been an equilibrium pro-
cess. Between 1995–2001, the annual economic growth has averaged 5%.
Figure 5.
The difference between REER and equilibrium REER
From this we can conclude that in the period between 1996–2001 the REER of
the EEK was not overvalued. The fact that during the last 6 years the equilib-
rium real exchange rate and actual exchange rate have not differed significantly
for a longer period indirectly demonstrates the flexibility of the economy.
Notes: Positive values of the difference indicate that the actual REER was under-
valued with respect to equilibrium REER and vice versa.
Source: Randveer and Rell (2002).349 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
The argument that the actual REER has not exceeded the equilibrium exchange
rate level or, put differently, that the actual REER has not been overvalued is
also supported by trends in Estonian foreign trade. Between 1998–2001, annual
exports growth has exceeded imports growth – during that period the average
annual exports growth rate was 17%, the corresponding figure for imports was
14%. These foreign trade developments provide indirect evidence that the con-
tinual real appreciation of the REER has not negatively affected Estonia’s external
competitiveness.
As mentioned, the overvaluation of the REER just after the Russian crisis was
quite short-term. In addition to the flexibility in the labour market, support was
also provided by the rapid reorientation of Estonian trade from CIS to Western
European markets. In 1997, the share of Estonian goods exports to Russia
amounted to 14%, two years later (in 1999) it had decreased to only 5%. Dur-
ing the same period, the share of exports to the EU increased from 58% in 1997
to 70% in 1999. In addition to the shift of Estonian exports to Western Europe,
growth of exports to Europe generally was also quite strong (27% in 1998 and
6% in 1999). Together with the rapid reorientation of Estonian trade, there
were also significant changes to the role of manufacturing and commodities
within exports.
As a result of the Russian crisis, the importance of the food–processing industry
declined considerably; at the same time, against the background of overall
decline, there was rapid growth in the manufacture of machinery and equip-
ment. These trends also brought on changes to the structure of foreign trade
– the share of foodstuffs in exports decreased from 16% in the first half of
1998 to 6% in the first half of 2000; the share of machinery and equipment
increased during this period from 19% to 33%. The rapid reorientation of
trade and changes in the structure of the economy also points to the flexi-
bility of the economy.
4.3. The Resilience of the Financial Sector – The Estonian Financial Sector
during the Asian and Russian Crises
In addition to the fiscal discipline and flexibility of the real sector, the resilience
of the financial sector is the third important factor for the sustainability of the
CBA. In order to analyse the financial sector, we will discuss how this sector
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1998. It should be stressed that both of these shocks had a significant impact on
the Estonian economy. Because of these crises, the Estonian economy recorded
four consecutive quarters of negative economic growth starting from the fourth
quarter of 1998. The decline was steepest in the first half of the 1999 when
output and exports contracted by 2% and 6% respectively as compared to the
first half of 1998.
In conclusion, both the Asian and Russian crises could be considered a good
test of the sustainability of the CBA (particularly from the perspective of the
viability of the financial sector).
The beginning of these turbulent times in international markets coincided with a
peak in the economic cycle. In 1997, Estonia experienced a rapid increase of
domestic demand and a prompt widening of the current account deficit. The
reasons for such developments stemmed from an unsustainably high foreign capi-
tal inflow, while net capital inflow peaked at 17% of GDP in 1997. This was
triggered by portfolio inflows into the Tallinn Stock Exchange (opened in 1996),
as well as access to foreign borrowing attained by the banking sector.
The portfolio inflows along with optimistic behaviour among domestic inves-
tors yielded a rapid growth in stock prices – the Talse index increased about five
times between the III quarter of 1996 and the III quarter of 1997. These develop-
ments entailed overly optimistic behaviour and expectations on the part of economic
agents. At the same time, the banking sector was willing to take higher risks in
financing domestic credit demand (and banks’ stock-market activities) via extensive
foreign borrowing. Consequently, developments such as an increasing money sup-
ply, falling interest rate levels and rises in financial asset prices resulted in rapidly
increasing economic activity and a widening current account deficit.
The Asian and Russian crises substantially shrunk capital flows oriented to emerg-
ing markets and tested several countries against foreign investor confidence.
Most emerging markets, including Estonia, were hit by increases in interest rates
and the perceived country risk level. Due to the currency board based monetary
system and the small volume of the money market, short-term interest rates in
Estonia respond rapidly to changing foreign capital flows and speculative at-
tacks against national currency since the central bank does not intervene in money
or forex markets (Lepik, 1999).351 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
The first influences of the Asian crisis were felt in the form of discontinued
capital flows, sharp decreases in stock prices (two times during the last quarter
of 1997) and in speculative pressure against the Estonian kroon. This resulted in
increasing interest rates and decreasing economic activity. The influence of the
Russian crisis was somewhat different, as the banking sector was already experi-
encing modest foreign capital inflow and decelerating growth of monetary
aggregates. The impact from the Russian crisis affected the banking sector mainly
through a deteriorating liquidity position (although, the effects varied between
the different banks). The speculative pressures against the Estonian kroon were,
however, less existent than during the Asian crisis. Also, diminishing real sector
activity after the Russian crisis can be attributed both to a negative exchange
rate shock as well as decreased credit supply.
4.3.1. Speculations against the Estonian Kroon over Foreign Currency Swap
and Forward Markets
The Asian crisis engaged a sharp increase in speculative positions over foreign
currency swaps and the forward market, culminating at the end of October 1997.
The German mark-Estonian kroon forward and swap transactions (as well as
spot transactions) increased during the last ten days of October by more than 4
billion Estonian kroon. Consequently, the banks’ open net positions against the
German mark became negative for the first time during the currency board era.
As a result, forward quotations climbed, pulling money market rates up also.
The speculative pressure against the Estonian kroon reflected a growing uncer-
tainty among foreign investors with regard to the sustainability of the fixed
exchange rate policy. This was caused by a deepening uncertainty towards emerg-
ing markets in general and about the economic situation in Estonia in particular.
Because of the increased cost of forward transactions and the stabilisation of
the overall situation, the volume of forward transactions calmed down in early
November 1997 and thereafter displayed a steady falling tendency.
During the Russian crisis in 1998, the foreign currency swap and forward mar-
ket also experienced a substantial rise in price quotations (see Figure 6). Unlike
October 1997, the rise in quotations was not followed by a notable increase in
trading volumes, as the speculative pressures were smaller. Therefore, pressure
on the currency was felt mainly as a result of high forward rates (Lepik, 1999).
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the Russian crisis. On the one hand, position taking was restrained by the avail-
ability of bank funds and commercial banks reduced limits related to forward
transactions. On the other hand, a huge bid-offer spread in foreign currencies
and high interest levels made speculations expensive.
Figure 6.
Interest rates of forward transactions (one month to one year) from June
1997 to March 1999
Because of the consolidation process in the banking sector and the involvement
of foreign capital, foreign bank short positions in the Estonian kroon started to
decrease on the forward market from November 1998 and with them also for-
ward price quotations of the Estonian kroon. By December 1998, forward market
conditions had returned to pre-crisis levels.
4.3.2. Decreases in Money Supply, Capital Flows and Market Liquidity
The Asian crisis restrained capital inflows into Estonia in August-September
1997 and the growth of money supply calmed down. In addition, foreign cur-
rency deposits held by Estonian residents as a share of the broad money supply,
which had sustained a level of 10–12% throughout 1997, rose up to 15%. The
higher preference for foreign currency deposits by economic agents was caused
by uncertainties on the money market and stock markets in the last quarter of
1997 and growing speculation about the credibility of the Estonian kroon.353 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
In spite of halting growth in their liabilities, banks also continued expansive
crediting of the real sector in August and September 1997. Due to expectations
in the financial sector remaining optimistic, the longer-term interest rates re-
mained low. Moreover, banks used short-term reserves for extending credit,
hoping to attract additional foreign capital. Consequently, delay in foreign emis-
sions as well as mismatch of credit and money supply growth resulted in a
deteriorating liquidity position for the banks. Therefore, shorter-term money
market rates started to increase in September. An interest rate hike was further
fostered by increased speculative pressures on the forex market in October.
Imbalance in the development of the credit market and the gradual deterioration
of external conditions forced the banks to promptly restrict the expansion of
loan portfolios leading to an increase in loan interest rates in the fourth quarter
of 1997, in turn inhibiting credit demand. The effect on banking sector liquidity
during the Asian crisis remained, however, more modest than during the Rus-
sian crisis. In addition, banks were partly able to cover their stock market losses
using the higher income from the forex forward market stemming from specu-
lative pressures against the Estonian kroon in 1997.
The impact of the Russian crisis affected the banking sector mainly through
deteriorating liquidity positions. Several factors had a disturbing impact on bank
cash flows and liquidity positions in the second half of 1998.
Firstly, the banking sector was affected by unusually modest foreign capital in-
flows and by a decreasing money supply throughout 1998. The decline in money
supply was due to several factors. First of all the Asian and Russian economic
crisis decreased the credibility of emerging economies which, in turn, triggered
a decline of foreign capital inflows to those countries (including Estonia). These
developments were also exacerbated by a slowdown in the Estonian economy.
As a result of these developments the foreign capital inflows decreased from 11
billion EEK in 1997 to 7 billion EEK in 1998. Also, the nature of capital flows
changed, displaying a significant shift from debt instruments towards equity based
financing except in the refinancing of the banks’ short-term liabilities (Lepik,
1999).
Secondly, the Russian crisis raised concerns about possible banking sector ex-
posure in Russia, both directly through financial investments and indirectly
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related to the Asian crisis (stock-market losses), one medium-sized bank was
closed in June 1998, just a few months prior to the Russian crisis. This de-
creased the credibility of the banking sector and amplified concerns about the
strength of smaller banks. Therefore, the decreased credibility of the banking
sector and subsequent problems with smaller banks brought about a withdrawal
of deposits from Estonian banks (especially from the smaller banks) in autumn
1998. In addition, although the total exposure of the banking sector in Russia
was small, this exposure was concentrated in the smaller banks. Consequently,
two small banks were closed and the third largest bank in Estonia was rescued
by the central bank in autumn 1998.
In addition, the Russian crisis caused a slowdown in the growth rate of con-
sumer incomes and corporate profits as well. It is reasonable to assume that
private individuals temporarily used part of their deposits for consumption
smoothing and enterprises used their cash balances to cushion the growing prob-
lems with external financing. On top of this, the increased proportion of bad
loans in certain economic sectors (for example food processing industries), which
had experienced a sharp drop in their exports due to the devaluation of the
Russian rouble, meant a further decrease in cash flows in the banking sector.
Consequently, for the first time since the beginning of 1993, money supply (both
M2 and M1) contracted in absolute terms in the second half of 1998. Broader
money supply decreased from 28 billion EEK at the end of July 1998 to 25.5
billion EEK by the end of January 1999. Shifts in the broader money supply
reflected also a decrease in Estonian kroon components and an increase in
foreign currency deposits (see Figure 7).
The proportion of liquid assets in bank balance sheets also decreased under the
impact of the Russian crisis. Nonetheless, bank liquidity buffers were on aver-
age, bigger in the second half of 1998 than they had been during the first liquidity
crisis in October 1997. During 1998, banks extensively used the standing de-
posit facility, which marked a higher demand for reserves stemming from
international uncertainty (Lepik, 1999).355 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
Figure 7.
The dynamics of the components of money supply from June 1998 to March
1999
In real sector credit markets, the influence of the Russian crisis reinforced the
already prevailing trend – a decline in credit growth (see Figure 8). In the fourth
quarter of 1998, credit to residents started to decline (this trend continued until
the third quarter of 1999). On the one hand, the Russian crisis decreased the
corporate sector investment demand and thereby reduced the demand for loans;
on the other hand, it caused the commercial banks to adopt a more conservative
lending policy. An important aspect is that in 1998 banks substantially decreased
credit availability for the real sector, as they were concerned about possible real
sector exposures in Russia. As uncertainty about the consequences of events in
Russia on real sector developments was high, restricting loan availability was
the easiest way to protect themselves from possible further losses.
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Figure 8.
The growth of money supply and credit 1997–2000
The Russian crisis also had an effect on long-term interest rates (the average
long-term interest rates increased from 12% in the third quarter of 1998 to 14%
in the fourth quarter of 1998). However, this increase in long-term interest rates
might underestimate the tightening in the loan market as credit rationing in-
creased after the outbreak of the Russian crisis (Pikkani, 2001).
4.3.3. The Result of the Crisis
The two-year period starting from the second half of 1997 demonstrated the
Estonian financial system’s ability to cope with rapid changes in the environ-
ment. In spite of the difficult environment, the larger commercial banks did not
have major difficulties and were able to withstand losses from non-performing
loans. However, as the burden of adjustment remains with banks, two years of
turbulence resulted in a wave of consolidation in the banking system. The number
of banks fell from 12 in 1997 to 6 in 199916. This restructuring did not involve
remarkable loss for depositors or serious deterioration in asset quality. The fi-
nancial sector proved its performance efficiency in the face of severe external
shocks (Lepik, 1999).
16 There were three mergers; one of them was a rescue operation of the third largest bank in
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It could be said that the Estonian financial sector emerged stronger from this
turmoil. The capitalisation and liquidity of the banks increased and the involve-
ment of Nordic banking groups from the end of 1998 increased the credibility of
domestic banks. A remarkable change was the way activities shifted from the
domestic market to the broader inter-bank money market, with the main coun-
terparts being Nordic banks. Due to rapid consolidation and the involvement of
strategic investors the banking sector is highly capitalised, the banking groups
are the largest in the Baltic States and have become acceptable players for the
markets of central Europe (Lepik, 1999).
In 2000, Estonia participated in the IMF pilot project – the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP). The FSAP mission also found that the financial
sector vulnerability had reduced substantially and banking sector had strength-
ened considerably during 1999–2000 (IMF, 2000). Therefore, one can conclude
that the sustainability of the Estonian financial sector has increased during last
years, which upholds the argument that it strongly supports the sustainability of
the CBA itself.
5. Conclusions
We conclude that, although the Estonian CBA is sometimes regarded as a
currency-board like system; its practical set-up is rather orthodox. The cur-
rency stability objective is tied up with the anchoring role of the exchange rate,
and all necessary adjustments are left to the market. There exists neither discre-
tionary monetary policy instruments nor other monetary policy targets in Estonia.
We analysed the most essential preconditions for the sustainability of the
Estonian CBA, namely fiscal policy stance, the flexibility of the real sector and
resilience of the financial sector.
First, fiscal discipline is an essential prerequisite for sustainability, as the CBA
eliminates or limits the capability of the monetary authorities to monetise fiscal
deficits. The government can still run an expansionary fiscal policy via exces-
sive borrowing, which, in turn, may undermine the stability of the economy and
create political pressures against the CBA. In Estonia, there has been relatively
strong consensus for a responsible fiscal policy since the monetary reform. The
government has avoided large fiscal deficits; consequently, Estonian public debt358 Urmas Sepp, Raoul Lättemäe, Martti Randveer
both external and internal – has been very small (less than 10% of GDP), thereby
supporting the sustainability of the CBA.
Second, as the authorities cannot implement discretionary monetary policy un-
der the CBA, more adjustments should take place through the real sector –
especially via wages and prices. In Estonia, factors that are usually attributed to
labour market flexibility – strong trade unions, wage indexation, unemployment
benefits and so on – are not so binding on the development of the labour market.
In addition, most of the studies that have analysed the flexibility of the real
sector have concluded that Estonian goods and labour markets are fairly flex-
ible. The rather high unemployment ratio at the same time reflects high structural
unemployment, especially in rural areas.
After the monetary reform in 1992, Estonia has witnessed a strong real ex-
change rate appreciation. This has led to discussions about a possible
misalignment of the real effective exchange rate with a subsequent negative
impact on competitiveness. However, empirical studies show that the actual
REER has not exceeded the equilibrium exchange rate level and thus has not
negatively affected Estonian external competitiveness.
Third, turbulent years in financial markets during the Asian and Russian crises
have provided excellent case studies for the behaviour of the Estonian CBA in a
difficult environment. These years demonstrated the ability of Estonia’s finan-
cial system to cope with severe external shocks. The resilience of the financial
sector proved to be strong, supporting the conclusion that the CBA in Estonia is
sustainable.
In conclusion, we can say that Estonian economy has fulfilled all the prerequi-
sites for a successful development under a CBA. Economic developments during
the last decade have also been rather successful, hence supporting the
sustainability of the CBA in Estonia.359 The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia
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Appendix
The main developments of the monetary policy operational framework in
Estonia 1992–2001
The CBA principles were laid down through the unlimited forex window facility
in 1992 (the bid-ask spreads were set up at 0.5%). In addition, a compulsory
(non-averaged, non-remunerated) reserve requirement at 10% of banking sec-
tor liabilities was maintained17. The unsophisticated financial sector and simplicity
of CBA features permitted the preservation of the monetary policy framework
in a largely unchanged format during the first four years. The only important
development was the introduction of Bank of Estonia CDs in spring 1993, the
main aim of this instrument was, however, to foster money market development
not to move towards discretion.
The first major set of reforms to the monetary policy operational framework
was carried out in 1996 when the averaging of reserve requirements was intro-
duced, the spreads in the forex window on German mark transactions were
abolished and remuneration of excess reserves was introduced (the latter is also
called the deposit facility in the Estonian framework). These steps were aimed
at improving liquidity management in the banking sector as well as accommo-
date market-based principles into the framework.
The next set of changes was already carried out in 1997 and caused by concerns
about excessive monetary developments. More concretely, increasing capital
inflow as well as financial sector over-borrowing from foreign markets during
1996–97 fostered domestic demand, which resulted in a rapidly deteriorating
current account deficit. As a currency board sets clear limits on the use of mon-
etary tools for implementing restrictive policies, the ‘stabilisation package’
contained a number of strategies. These not only included the strengthening of
compulsory reserves but also increased prudential capital adequacy requirements,
postponing (for some months) the order for a sovereign credit rating and the
formation of stabilisation reserves from the fiscal surplus. In the monetary frame-
17 In 1992, the aim was to increase the requirement from 10% to 15% (by monthly 1 percen-
tage points increase) to improve the credibility of the banking-sector. The increase of the
requirement ratio was however stopped at 12% and reversed back to 10% in October 1992,
as the liquidity situation in the banking system was volatile and was making it difficult to
fulfil the requirement.362 Urmas Sepp, Raoul Lättemäe, Martti Randveer
work, this meant a widening of the reserve base and increases to bank reserve
balances with the Bank of Estonia from 10 to 13 per cent through the introduc-
tion of an additional liquidity requirement.
Between 1999–2000, concerns about possible distortions caused by a relatively
high and uncompensated reserve requirement as well as the need to start pre-
paring operational convergence of the Estonian monetary framework with the
Eurosystem, resulted in preparing major changes in the monetary framework
through the further development of the Bank of Estonia’s rule-based facilities.
These reforms of the monetary operational framework were aimed at improving
the rule-based facilities, which form the core of the Estonian CBA. The goal is
to start operational convergence with the EMU and reorganisation of the re-
quired reserves’ system. As a first step, in 1999 remuneration of the required
reserves was introduced. This step aimed to decrease structural deviations as
well as to signal that higher liquidity buffers in the financial system are still
sufficient to cope with possible volatilities.
As a next major step among these changes, partial fulfilling of the reserve re-
quirements with high quality (with at least AA-/Aa3 credit rating) euro
denominated foreign securities from national governments in advanced western
countries and supra-national institutions has been permitted since January 2001
(initially up to 25% of the reserve requirement, since July up to 50% of the
reserve requirement). This means lowering the rate of required reserves with
the central bank (in the national currency) with a simultaneous rise of the re-
quired reserves in high-rated liquid foreign assets (in an anchor currency). Such
a treatment of eligible assets in fulfilling reserve requirements allows the bank-
ing system to use their liquid assets more efficiently as well as ensuring that
there exists sufficient liquidity buffers in the financial system.
This reform is also future-oriented, as it helps the banking system start accumu-
lating assets and operate with them, thereby providing a basis for Eurosystem
monetary operations.  It is important to note that all permissible securities be-
long to Tier 1 assets of the Eurosystem.